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A B S T R A C T
This article explores the history of the Court of Protection of England & Wales (CoP) over the twentieth century.
The CoP, which is responsible for making ﬁnancial and welfare decisions on behalf of those deemed incapable of
doing so themselves, presently faces a rapidly growing caseload, and considerable scrutiny and critique. Such
close attention to its work may be new, but many of the issues it faces have deep roots. Using practitioners' texts,
judgements, and the archives of the CoP and the Lord Chancellor's Oﬃce, I review the evolution of the CoP in
terms of its structure and caseload, its decisions regarding incapacity, its eﬀorts to manage the aﬀairs of those
found incapable, and its long-term survival. This reveals the origins of many of the issues it faces today, the
diﬀerent anxieties and approaches that have animated its work in the past, the ways in which approaches to
incapacity have changed, and the value of a historical perspective.
1. Introduction
The role of the Court of Protection of England and Wales (CoP),
according to its website, is to ‘make decisions on ﬁnancial or welfare
matters for people who can't make decisions at the time they need to be
made (they “lack mental capacity”).’ This weighty responsibility and
wide-ranging power in relation to some of society's most vulnerable has
attracted considerable attention over the last decade. According to an
assortment of newspaper articles, this is ‘the most sinister Court in
Britain’, ‘Britain's most secret court’, and the ‘secret court of living hell’,
with ‘the power of life or death’ (Beckford, 2010; Booker, 2015, 2016;
Lewis, 2009). It has attracted less shrill but much more searching
scrutiny and critique from academic circles, with a profusion of re-
search into the court's activities and associated issues of determining
mental incapacity, autonomy, best interests, participation, supported
decision-making, transparency, and the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Clough, 2018; Coggon, 2016;
Craigie & Davies, 2019; Kong, 2017; Ruck Keene, Kane, Kim, & Owen,
2019; Series, 2016; Series & Nilsson, 2018).1 The CoP has also been
criticised by the UK Parliament (House of Lords Select Committee on
the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 2014) and in trade publications (Sofaer,
2010), primarily for being expensive, slow, and ineﬃcient, while the
ﬁnancial abuse of those who lack capacity remains a concern (Dalley &
Gilhooly, 2017; Terrell, Bielanska, Holmes, & Frimston, 2018, p. viii).
All the while, Ministry of Justice statistics for the Family Courts show
that the CoP's caseload is increasing. This area of the law clearly pre-
sents problems both practical and conceptual in nature, which are af-
fecting growing numbers of people.
The present Court of Protection was established in 2007 under the
Mental Capacity Act, 2005 (MCA). An attempt to tell its twentieth
century history may therefore seem strange, but in fact the CoP pre-
dates the MCA in name, concept, and in substantive parts of its role.
This is sometimes acknowledged in textbooks and wider discussion
(Terrell et al., 2018, p. 46), but is more often obscured by perceptions of
the MCA as a watershed moment. The MCA, as former Senior Judge and
Master of the CoP Denzil Lush has remarked, was wrongly viewed by
some as a ‘blank canvas’ onto which a brand new approach to mental
capacity could be painted (Lush, 2018). This perspective, in which the
history of the CoP is overlooked, reﬂects the fact that the CoP was not at
any time during the twentieth century particularly well-known or high-
proﬁle. Its decisions were rarely reported, it was not the target of the
century's mental health legislation, and its activities provoked virtually
no controversy or public attention. Yet, this little-known institution
became the cornerstone of contemporary mental capacity law and
practice. Its survival, in essence if not in exact replica, makes England &
Wales the only jurisdiction with a specialist court of this kind for mental
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2019.101524
Received 10 September 2019; Received in revised form 8 November 2019; Accepted 9 November 2019
E-mail address: janet.weston@lshtm.ac.uk.
1 Relevant large-scale research projects include the Essex Autonomy Project<https://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/> , Judging Values and Participation in Mental Capacity
Law<http://www.icpr.org.uk/judging-values-and-participation-mental-capacity-law > , Mental Health and Justice<https://mhj.org.uk/> , and Welfare Cases in
the Court of Protection<https://sites.cardiﬀ.ac.uk/wccop/> . Special issues of journals include ‘The Mental Capacity Act, 2005 – Ten Years On’,Medical Law Review,
24.3 (2016) and ‘Mental Capacities and Legal Responsibilities’, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 40 (2015).
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 68 (2020) 101524
0160-2527/ © 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).
T
capacity decisions (Ruck Keene et al., 2019, p. 59). What did the ‘old’
CoP do, and why did it endure? How did it tackle the problems of its
own time, many of which resonate strongly with those of today? By
oﬀering a history of this institution over the twentieth century, I hope
to show both the deep roots of some of the issues currently facing the
CoP, and the rather diﬀerent anxieties and approaches to incapacity
that have animated its work in the past.
Beyond these speciﬁc concerns, a short history of the CoP fulﬁls two
further goals. Firstly, it oﬀers insights into the evolution of mental
health law in England & Wales, and the idea of mental capacity itself.
Histories of psychiatry often focus on hospitals, admissions, and the
statutes that govern them, but I show that attention to other aspects of
historical mental health law such as incapacity reveal patterns of stasis
and change that would otherwise go unnoticed. Legal scholarship on
mental capacity sometimes looks to history to point out patterns and
diversions in how the needs of persons with disabilities or doubtful
capacity have been tackled across time (Allen, 2015). The past has also
been mined for speciﬁc solutions, when legal diﬃculties seem to reach
crunch-point (Hoggett, 1988; Ward, 1990). But, as Peter Bartlett has
observed, our understanding of mental capacity decisions themselves
has been limited by the fact that there was ‘no general mechanism to
report those found to be lacking capacity, nor in general to monitor the
decisions being made about these people’ (Bartlett & Sandland, 2000, p.
349). Such decisions were diﬀuse and thus diﬃcult to locate, with the
result that the meaning and uses of the concept have remained elusive.
But by focusing on the history of the CoP, where determinations of
mental capacity were consistently being made, we can begin to develop
a richer understanding of the concept, how it was handled, and what
has changed or stayed the same over time. This history is accessible
through practitioners' textbooks, the few available reported and un-
reported judgements, administrative records, and especially through
the archive of case ﬁles and administrative records available at the
National Archives in London.2 This attention to the history of in-
capacity shows that today's approaches are not always as novel as their
proponents sometimes imply, and – in case there remained any doubt –
conﬁrms that ‘mental incapacity’ is not and never has been an objective
truth to be uncovered.
Secondly, this article engages with current debate about the role
and value of history. As Russell Sandberg has recently argued, legal
history has considerable radical potential. It can demonstrate that ‘legal
institutions are not ﬁxed, that every line drawn in the law and every-
thing the law holds as sacred is arbitrary’ (Sandberg, 2018, p. 24). This
article takes up this challenge, using a variety of sources including those
not typical to legal history, introducing new voices and perspectives,
and assessing the causes of change and its absence. It also demonstrates
that an understanding of the law demands knowledge of its operation in
context, linking the doctrinal with the socio-legal (Lacey, 2001). In
relation to mental incapacity, we see that changes in legal practice are
often accidental and unplanned, and that legal approaches are driven
by medical, social, economic, and practical contexts. I also seek to de-
monstrate that this kind of critical legal history can be applied to the
recent past as well as to more distant periods. Firstly, though, it is useful
to look slightly further back in time to provide a short explanation of
how the ‘old’ Court of Protection came to be.
2. The background to the Court of Protection
The origins of the CoP can be traced to a royal prerogative, the
evolution of which has been well summarised elsewhere (Bartlett &
Sandland, 2014; Lush, 2014; Stebbings, 2012; Theobald, 1924;
Unsworth, 1993). The prerogative conﬁrmed that the monarch ex-
ercised authority over the property of ‘lunatics’ and ‘idiots’. Over time,
this authority was delegated to the Lord Chancellor, and from him to
the Judge in Lunacy, and by the late nineteenth century, to the two
Masters in Lunacy (who became one in number in 1923). By the 1800s,
it was enacted through a Commission in Lunacy which could be in-
stigated by any interested party, but usually a family member of the
alleged lunatic. This would prompt an event called an inquisition. The
outcome of the inquisition could be determined by the Judge or Master
alone, or heard before a jury with witnesses called and questioned. This
latter option became increasingly rare. If the person were found by
inquisition to be lunatic or idiot, a ‘committee of the estate’ – again,
often a family member – was appointed to look after their property.
There might also be a ‘committee of the person’, appointed to be re-
sponsible for the individual's personal welfare. This separation within
the incapacity jurisdiction between property and personal welfare be-
came signiﬁcant in the late twentieth century.
Over the nineteenth century, procedures surrounding Commissions
in Lunacy were adjusted and reﬁned. Important changes included the
creation of the Lord Chancellor's Visitors in 1833, positions to be held
by two senior doctors and a barrister of at least 10 years standing. The
Visitors were tasked with monitoring those under the guardianship of a
committee, and providing reports to the Oﬃce of the Masters in Lunacy.
Further adjustments included changes to the powers of the Judge and
Masters in Lunacy to enable more streamlined estate management and
abbreviated forms of inquisition for less aﬄuent individuals, although
Commissions in Lunacy remained expensive and impractical for all but
the fairly well-to-do. Cost was not the only disincentive to this type of
intervention. Much like their successors today, Masters in Lunacy la-
boured under the disadvantage of being perceived as secretive and
mysterious. At the same time, since inquisitions before a jury were open
to all, they could involve the extremely public airing of personal and
family matters. Occasionally, inquisitions with juries such as the case of
William Windham in 1861 attracted considerable publicity and scrutiny
(Degerman, 2019; Heaton, 2012; Jones, 1971; Taylor, 1883). This un-
welcome attention, in combination with the boom in asylum popula-
tions over the nineteenth century, meant that the number of inquisi-
tions was declining.
The growth of the asylum population had a twofold impact upon
inquisitions. Firstly, it meant that opportunities for the kind of ques-
tionable decision-making that might prompt a Commission in Lunacy,
such as William Windham's gifts of extremely expensive jewellery, were
more easily controlled by alternative means. After all, individuals who
were lawfully detained as persons of unsound mind could ﬁnd their
access to both money and people greatly restricted in a day to day
sense, meaning that more formal steps to regulate their ﬁnancial habits
were often unnecessary. Secondly, it prompted the beginnings of an
alternative structure within which decisions about mental capacity and
ﬁnancial management could be made. This began with the Lunacy
Regulation Act of 1862, which provided that the Lord Chancellor could
‘make [an asylum patient's] property available for the patient's beneﬁt
or maintenance. It could be sold and the proceeds paid to a relative or
other proper person to apply under the court's direction’ (Stebbings,
2012, p. 396). The party receiving funds to manage in this way was
known as a receiver. The receiver had no formal control over the
person, only their property, and was answerable to the court. Im-
portantly, this process did not require an inquisition, as the individual
in question had already been detained as a person of unsound mind.
Their inability to manage their aﬀairs was assumed.
Additional alternatives to inquisitions were introduced by the 1890
Lunacy Act. Historian of psychiatry Akihito Suzuki has argued that this
Act created ways for people to avoid Commissions of Lunacy (Suzuki,
2006). One such way for those detained in hospital had been provided
in 1862, as outlined above, but an inadvertently revolutionary aspect of
the 1890 Lunacy Act was to make this available for anybody at all, even
if they were not detained as a person of unsound mind. To do this,
2 Case ﬁles can be found under catalogue references J127 (records of the
Oﬃcial Solicitor) and J92 (records of the Court of Protection), at The National
Archives, London (hereafter TNA). Administrative records are scattered within
the records of the Lord Chancellor's Oﬃce, catalogue reference LCO.
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section 116 (d) of the 1890 Act empowered the Judge and Masters in
Lunacy to appoint a receiver to manage the aﬀairs of anyone, if they
were satisﬁed that the individual was incapable of managing their af-
fairs ‘by reason of inﬁrmity caused by disease or age’. Thus, in order to
place an individual's aﬀairs in the care of a receiver, it was no longer
necessary to for them to be lawfully detained or to undergo a poten-
tially public (and expensive) inquisition. The primary intention behind
section 116 (d) had been to protect the estates of those who suﬀered
from mental inﬁrmity due to old age or ‘excess’ (Heywood and Massey,
1907, p. 90; Theobald, 1924, p. 6), but, as we will see, it was inter-
preted far more widely in the twentieth century than its drafters had
likely imagined.
Although receivers and committees of the estate initially had
slightly diﬀerent powers, these had been equalised by the early twen-
tieth century. The process of applying for a receiver was faster, easier,
and cheaper than a Commission in Lunacy. Unsurprisingly, it became
the more popular option. In 1890 there were over 1000 lunatics so
found by inquisition, but by 1922 this number had dwindled to less
than 300 (Theobald, 1924, p. 80). By 1954, the inquisition procedure
was ‘nearly obsolete’, recommended only on rare occasions to meet the
requirements of foreign jurisdictions, to prevent someone from mar-
rying, or to exercise another form of restraint or control over the person
such as to ‘compel a patient to accept care or treatment’ outside a
hospital (HMSO, 1957, p. 267; Hunt & Phillips, 1954). The option of an
inquisition (and of a committee of the person) was eﬀectively removed
once and for all by the Mental Health Act of 1959, although the last
person to have been the subject of an inquisition died as recently as
March 2018 (In the matter of A [2018]). While inquisitions and com-
mittees of the person or estate fell into obsolescence, the number of
receivers rose steeply. It was therefore mostly the appointment, over-
sight, and discharge of receivers that occupied the Masters in Lunacy
during the twentieth century. And it was their oﬃce, known variously
as the Oﬃce of the Masters in Lunacy, Lunacy Oﬃce, and Management
& Administration Department, which was to become the Court of Pro-
tection.
2.1. From lunacy to protection
The term ‘lunacy’ was falling out of oﬃcial use in the early twen-
tieth century. The Rules in Lunacy dating from 1892 laid out forms that
avoided the word, particularly for those coming under the jurisdiction
of the Masters in Lunacy under the terms of section 116 (d) of the 1890
Act: those who had not been found lunatic at inquisition or detained as
persons of unsound mind, but were nevertheless deemed incapable due
to ‘disease or age’. These individuals were perhaps not lunatics at all, it
was acknowledged, but simply elderly or mentally frail. In any case, it
was ‘not thought desirable’ to publicise the condition of those coming
under the aegis of the Lunacy Oﬃce in quite such stark terms (Re
Browne [1894], 415). Complaints were reportedly raised that it was
injurious to those struggling with mental inﬁrmity to receive docu-
ments headed ‘In Lunacy’, and there are examples in the archives of
attempts to conceal such papers from the individuals they described
because of the distress that the word ‘lunacy’ might cause (TNA J92/
22). The word was quietly dropped from ever-more items of paperwork,
but its disappearance in the 1920s from the Oﬃce letterhead caused
problems. The Oﬃce of the Master in Lunacy became, simply, the Oﬃce
of the Master. Located at the Royal Courts of Justice, where there were
many other Masters to be found, correspondence so addressed was li-
able to go astray. Gerald Hildyard KC, who held the position of Master
in Lunacy from 1923 to 1928, proposed ‘Management and
Administration Department’ as a practical alternative name for his of-
ﬁce in 1925. With some satisfaction, he pointed out that the M.A.D.
retained a reference to lunacy in its initials (TNA LCO 4/53).
Hildyard seems to have been alone in his approval of this new name.
His successor as Master, Henry Methold KC, found the acronym ‘more
apt than happy’ and colleagues complained that the full name was
cumbersome, confusing, and even downright misleading (TNA LCO 4/
53). Methold proposed a name for his department that reﬂected its
ancient lineage, along the lines of the ‘Court of the King's Wards’, but
this proposal was not very warmly received. One repeated concern was
that children who were wards of court might be tainted with con-
notations of mental illness (TNA LCO 4/53). Stigma was clearly still
present. Chancery Judge Sir Albert Clauson suggested something in-
cluding the word ‘protection’, such as ‘Court of Protection’, and this was
ﬁnally adopted in 1947 under the Patients' Estates (Naming of Master's
Oﬃces) Order. ‘Court of Protection’ never generated any great en-
thusiasm, though. It was, simply, the only suggestion to which nobody
objected very strongly. As the Master of the Rolls observed when the
new name was agreed, ‘I have racked my brains but for the life of me I
can think of nothing better…. the perfect word probably doesn't exist’
(TNA LCO 4/53).
These changes of name did not themselves herald new structures or
practices, but they were not without meaning. ‘Lunacy’ disappeared as
ideas of mental illness changed and a wider variety of mental inﬁrmities
were recognised (Long, 2014; Takabayashi, 2017; Westwood, 2010).
New medical approaches reﬂecting this shift took the form of clinics for
the early and voluntary treatment of nervous or functional disorder.
These began to emerge in the early twentieth century and were then
encouraged by the recognition and treatment of shell shock during and
after the First World War (Barham, 2004; Loughran, 2017; Weston,
2017 chapter 2). Attention to the impact of stigma surrounding mental
illness, as well as the existence of a wide variety of disturbed states of
mind that did not ﬁt the mold of ‘lunacy’, meant that the term ‘lunacy’
itself became less common in medical and policy circles, and the word
‘lunatic’ was prohibited from any statutory enactments or subordinate
documents by s.20 of the Mental Treatment Act of 1930. It is notable
that the ﬁeld of mental capacity law and practice was an early adopter
in this respect, avoiding the term and adopting a broader view of those
for whom it should be responsible as early as the 1890s.
That said, the adoption of the prosaic ‘Management and
Administration Department’ indicates a lack of concern for status and
external recognition. It is perhaps unsurprising that this name was
proposed and implemented by the shortest-serving Master in Lunacy.
Master Hildyard may have been less interested in the status of the de-
partment than some of his longer-serving colleagues and successors,
and less aware of the value of asserting the importance of his depart-
ment. This was, after all, a niche and low status matter, and the Lunacy
Oﬃce was an unusual and somewhat anachronistic entity which had
been under pressure to merge with the Chancery Division for decades
(Stebbings, 2012; Theobald, 1924, pp. 77, 83–84). Insistence following
Hildyard's departure that the Department should become the ‘Court of
the King's Wards’, an altogether grander option, suggests a sensitivity to
status and survival. So, too, did the dogged determination to include the
word ‘Court’ in place of ‘department’ or ‘oﬃce’. This was a strategic
move with long-term consequences. All could agree in 1947 that for
‘certain purposes the Master in Lunacy is a court and has been so held’
(TNA LCO 4/53), even though it was an oﬃce in which the vast ma-
jority of decisions were made, not by judges, but by the Master and
Assistant Masters, not all of whom were qualiﬁed legal practitioners.
The notion of a ‘court’ run by civil servants became troublesome as its
work attained a much higher public proﬁle at the end of the century
(Law Commission, 1995, 2.50). Nevertheless, the idea that these mat-
ters should indeed be handled by a separate and specialist entity was
suﬃciently well established for the CoP to be reconstituted in 2007 as a
superior court of record.
Including the word ‘protection’, as well as ‘court’, was also strate-
gically wise. It brought suggestions of safeguarding and support, which
tallied with the expanding welfare state of the 1940s. Indeed, Assistant
Master Ronald Poyser, who pressed most energetically for the change of
name in 1947, ﬁrmly believed that the Court of Protection should be
viewed as a branch of this new welfare state (TNA LCO 2/7695).
‘Protection’ was also associated in the minds of 1940s judges and civil
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servants with ﬁnance in the form of protective tariﬀs (TNA LCO 4/53).
‘Court of Protection’ thus drew discreet attention to the property itself
that was to be protected, rather than the receivers to be supervised or
administration undertaken. After all, it was the scale of this property
and the complexities involved in its management that had helped to
ensure that survival of the Oﬃce in the nineteenth century (Stebbings,
2012). It oversaw property worth over £4 million in 1905 (HMSO,
1908, p. 263), equivalent to something like £314 million today.3 A new
name hinting at such signiﬁcant responsibilities may have helped to
cast the Court of Protection as a distinctive and valuable institution,
also playing some small part in its remarkable survival.
3. The Court of Protection caseload
The Court of Protection acquired a few new names over the ﬁrst half
of the twentieth century, then, but hereafter I will refer to it as the CoP
for simplicity and brevity. On the surface, little else was changing. The
1959 Mental Health Act was later identiﬁed as signiﬁcant for mental
incapacity law (Law Commission, 1995, 2.20), by placing the CoP on an
entirely statutory footing and revoking the royal prerogative, which
removed its formal authority over personal welfare matters. Following
further restrictions to guardianship powers in the 1980s, this created a
legal lacuna regarding decisions about medical treatment on behalf of
those lacking capacity. But this was an unintended outcome: the 1959
Act was not designed with any material eﬀects on the CoP in mind (TNA
LCO 2/7700). Indeed, the CoP was not the primary target of this Act or
the other mental health legislation of the century. It encountered no
major scandals, restructures, or other signs of upheaval. There were
very few reported judgements from the CoP itself or appealed there-
from. This peaceful façade has perhaps given the impression of stasis
and helped to render the ‘old’ CoP invisible. Yet, its work, its decisions,
and the people with whom it dealt were all undergoing change.
The ﬁrst change to record is the number of individuals under its
jurisdiction [Fig. 1]. A gradual increase in applications to the CoP over
the early 1900s reﬂected an equally gradual spread of awareness
amongst solicitors, bank managers, doctors, local welfare oﬃcers, and
others, that there was an alternative to the costly inquisition following
the Lunacy Act of 1890, and that the aﬀairs of a person of doubtful
capacity should not be ignored or left in the hands of unoﬃcial helpers
(Mills & Poyser, 1934). Applications alone approached 1000 during
1922 (Theobald, 1924, p. 103). The number of individuals with re-
ceivers overseeing their aﬀairs then underwent an extremely rapid rise
over the 1920s and 1930s, doubling in the 12 years to 1934, and more
than doubling again in just four more years (TNA LCO 4/49, TNA LCO
4/55). There was a distinct decline over the 1950s (HMSO, 1957, p.
291), which went into reverse at some point around the late 1960s or
early 1970s (House of Commons, 1974). Receiverships had therefore
peaked in the late 1940s in excess of 30,000, a ﬁgure that would be
reached again towards the end of the century (HC (Written answers) 2
May 1991 vol 190).
The reason for the sharp rise from the 1920s was the cause of some
contemporary speculation. In 1954, the seventh edition of the leading
practitioners' textbook, Heywood & Massey's Court of Protection Practice,
suggested that this ‘great increase’ had been down to ‘social changes
resulting in redistribution of wealth’ (Hunt & Phillips, 1954, p. 3). In
other words, more people were coming to the CoP because more of the
population had assets that might need protecting. This passing ob-
servation raises intriguing questions about contemporary perceptions of
welfare and taxes, and indeed, whether the authors were correct to
understand that wealth had been redistributed to a markedly diﬀerent
degree in the preceding decades. Setting these questions aside, research
elsewhere into income and wealth over the twentieth century has
suggested that the numbers of those in the UK who had no money or
property at all was decreasing over the early twentieth century. Over
the ﬁrst half of the century, for example, a rising percentage of the
working classes held money in a savings account of some kind
(Atkinson, 2000). More widespread ownership of any property, and
particularly property that involved ﬁnancial institutions with for-
malised processes for accessing assets, was likely to increase the
workload of the CoP.
This was not the only explanation. One CoP clerk speculated in 1934
that the ‘stress of economic conditions during recent years’ might be a
contributory factor (TNA LCO 4/48). Master Methold agreed that ﬁ-
nancial stress was not infrequently a cause of mental breakdown (TNA
LCO 4/50). The archive of CoP case ﬁles adds further insight along
these lines: ﬁnancial strain within a family often encouraged applica-
tions to the CoP to release an inﬁrm person's assets. Mrs. Emily
Mathews, for example, contacted the CoP in 1928, two years after her
husband Charles had been detained as a person of unsound mind, be-
cause she could no longer aﬀord the premiums on their joint life policy
with the Prudential. Mrs. Mathews asked to be appointed as her hus-
band's receiver so that the policy could be surrendered, easing the
burden on her small income and releasing capital to both her and her
husband (TNA J92/103). The idea of a relationship between prevailing
economic conditions and applications to the CoP is strengthened by the
fact that the number of receiverships rose once again in the 1970s, just
as unemployment rates and severe inﬂation began to take their toll.
This increase over the 1970s was preceded by a period of decline,
beginning around the end of the 1940s. This was intimately connected
to the arrival of a more comprehensive welfare state and particularly
the National Health Service (NHS), although evidence from 1949 sug-
gests that such an impact was by no means anticipated: a 1949 report
noted the persistent increase in CoP caseload to date with anxiety, and
made no mention of the possible eﬀects of new social care legislation
(TNA LCO 4/55). However, the interwar period had seen many appli-
cations to the CoP initiated or encouraged by local welfare oﬃcers,
guardians of the poor, and county councils, who had an interest in se-
curing the property of anyone receiving care who might have suﬃcient
means to pay for it. Even when such assets were minimal and required
for their owner's immediate personal use, local authorities could and
did request that the CoP grant a charge over the estate, so that re-
imbursement at a future date remained possible (TNA J92/1, J92/157,
re TRM [1939]). With the arrival of state-funded medical and hospital
treatment under the 1946 NHS Act, the question of recouping fees for
healthcare was removed. Furthermore, the 1948 National Assistance
Act revised the terms under which councils provided residential ac-
commodation for those in need of care, meaning that fees were means
tested and charging orders were not, as a rule, granted to local autho-
rities (Hunt & Phillips, 1954, pp. 137–139). One major incentive for
intervening in the property of those in hospitals or nursing homes was
thus removed. There are also signs that, over the 1950s, as the CoP
enjoyed some respite from its previously unrelenting workload, senior
staﬀ were anxious not to spread too much awareness about its role (TNA
LCO 2/5701).
This was only temporary. Steadily rising numbers from the 1970s
were interrupted only brieﬂy in the early 1980s, when a momentary
drop in applications can be attributed to an increase in fees charged by
the CoP (LCO 68/22) and a large amount of housekeeping in 1983
which led to the closure of many dormant ﬁles. After this, the number
of estates overseen by the CoP increased steadily and steeply.
Contemporary explanations in the later twentieth century almost in-
variably referred to an aging population, more likely to experience
senile dementia and then living longer with the condition (LCO 68/22).
In light of broader patterns across the century, we might also wonder
whether the costs of care, both medical and social, had some impact
after the welfare provisions in place over the 1950s were hollowed out.
The role of the CoP was expanded in 2007, making direct comparisons
3 This and subsequent currency conversions are very approximate, and use
the online tool available at< http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency-
converter>.
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of workload before and after that time less meaningful, but the rising
number of applications seems to be a continual trend. The impact of
future changes in the economy and social care provisions within
England & Wales remains to be seen.
4. Determining incapacity
As with references in the 1980s to the prevalence of senile de-
mentia, discussions about the CoP's caseload often touched upon the
wider context of mental illness and its incidence or identiﬁcation. In
more recent decades, such discussions tend to assume an absolute in-
crease in the number of people unable to manage their aﬀairs due to
illness and age, but earlier in the twentieth century commentators were
sensitive to the idea that perceptions of mental illness and incapacity,
and not prevalence, might be changing. In marked contrast with other
contexts, in which tests for capacity were well established, there was no
judicial determination of the meaning of ‘incapable of managing their
property and aﬀairs’ until 2002 (Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co
[2002]). This absence of a formal test for capacity to manage property
and aﬀairs left applicants to the CoP, medical advisers, and CoP oﬃcials
all somewhat freer to apply their own approaches and understandings,
interpreting the jurisdiction more widely at some times than others.
In the 1930s, CoP oﬃcials considered whether receiverships were
increasing thanks to a wider interpretation of mental disorder and de-
fect. This was attributed to the Mental Deﬁciency Acts of 1913 and
1927 and the Mental Treatment Act of 1930, all of which had expanded
the parameters of mental abnormality (TNA LCO 4/50). The eﬀects of a
wide interpretation of section 116 (d) of the 1890 Lunacy Act were also
acknowledged, since it had come to be used as something of a catch-all
provision to enable CoP intervention (Mills & Poyser, 1934, p. 16).
Exactly whose interpretations were driving this change went un-
speciﬁed, and the lack of any information about unsuccessful applica-
tions makes this hard to pin down. Shifting attitudes surrounding
mental illness might have encouraged families to perceive incapacity
more readily amongst their members, and might also have made it
easier to ﬁnd supportive doctors prepared to deliver the necessary af-
ﬁdavits of incapacity. Equally, the CoP itself may have looked more
favourably upon applications that it would have rejected out of hand in
an earlier era. It seems likely that each of these played some role, with
the rising CoP caseload over the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century re-
ﬂecting a broader idea of what it meant to be incapable to manage one's
aﬀairs on the part of the public, the medical profession, and the CoP
alike.
In practice, the wide and general terms of the 1890 Lunacy Act were
used in the early twentieth century to appoint receivers in cases where
partial or actual capacity was acknowledged, hospitalisation was un-
necessary, and the individual was able to live otherwise independently.
After Miss Francis Raggett was discharged from hospital as ‘recovered’,
for example, her doctors felt that she was ‘quite rational’ and able to
resume control over her property. However, the Lord Chancellor's
Visitor found that she was ‘contented that [her accountant] Mr Day
should continue to manage her aﬀairs’, and Miss Raggett lived the re-
maining nine years of her life in boarding houses and with friends,
‘quite sane’, ‘happy’, and ‘busily employed’, but beneﬁtting from the
‘supervision and help’ of her receiver (TNA J92/54). Mr. Arthur Short
also lived independently despite the fact that his mother had been ap-
pointed as his receiver on his 21st birthday. He was employed as a
mechanic's apprentice and then as a steward on cruise ships. Unlike
Miss Raggett, Mr. Short became increasingly dissatisﬁed with the re-
ceivership, and it was acknowledged within the CoP that there was
‘nothing to diﬀerentiate him from many other young men whose aﬀairs
have not been taken out of their hands’. After eighteen years, he suc-
cessfully applied to be restored to his property (TNA J92/38).
Further examples include individuals described as addicted to al-
cohol, weak in character, eccentric, or lacking self-conﬁdence. For the
CoP to intervene, there was usually either a large amount of money at
stake, or strong suggestions that the individual was already taking de-
cisions that were seen as unwise. This might include evidence of ex-
ploitation. Tellingly, most of these cases involved unmarried women,
and I have written elsewhere about the role of gender in CoP decisions
(Weston, 2019). Miss Alice Stevens had a tendency to run up debts
(TNA J127/123); Miss Jean Carr was young, rich, and thought to be at
risk from money-grabbing friends and suitors (TNA J92/77). Miss
Beatrice Alexander had apparently already fallen victim to a manip-
ulative family who had seized control of her home and money (J92/
24–27). As in the case of Miss Raggett, the wishes of the individual were
also taken into account, although their authenticity would be scruti-
nised in cases of suspected duress. Medical evidence was somewhat
secondary: it was often necessary for the applicant or the CoP to obtain
several medical statements or to negotiate with medical visitors and
family to implement and maintain receiverships in these borderline
cases. Files contain comments such as ‘fairly normal mentally,’ ‘the only
thing I ﬁnd with her is, she can be dominated by a stronger will’; and
even ‘able to manage herself and her aﬀairs’ (TNA J92/38, J127/24,
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J92/77). Clearly, the CoP was sometimes willing to intervene even
when it had reason to believe that illness or incapacity was very slight.
This approach foreshadows recent developments in the use of the
High Court's inherent jurisdiction to intervene in the aﬀairs of in-
dividuals who are acknowledged to have capacity, but who are seen as
vulnerable in the context of speciﬁc relationships and circumstances
(Szerletics, 2011). It also reﬂected the survival of an earlier practice, in
which intervention was based less upon the identiﬁcation of a speciﬁc
degree of incapacity, and more upon the perceived needs of the in-
dividual. As the Chief Clerk in the Oﬃce of the Masters in Lunacy wrote
in 1892, there may be cases where the Judge in Lunacy did not think
that proceedings were appropriate ‘though the mental inﬁrmity might
be such as fully to support them’. Equally, he went on,
there are cases in which, from even a less degree of mental in-
capacity, the interests of the alleged lunatic render it imperatively
necessary that he, and his property, should receive the protection
which it is the peculiar province of the Royal Prerogative to aﬀord.
The vital issue, he clariﬁed, was ‘the beneﬁt and advantage of the
particular individual’, (Elmer, 1892, p. 4) and not their mental state.
This impulse to intervene on the basis of perceived vulnerability or
need, and not on the basis of illness, is a recurring one, albeit one that
has sometimes been masked by a statutory emphasis upon impairment
(Hall, 2012).
These directions from 1892 also contain some elements of the cur-
rent functional approach to incapacity, in which an individual's capa-
city to make decisions must be considered in relation to the complexity
and importance of the speciﬁc decisions that face them (Ruck Keene
et al., 2019, p. 57). This Chief Clerk clearly endorsed attention to a full
picture of the individual's situation, and not simply their state of mind.
The above examples from the 1920s and 1930s of individuals with both
a receiver and some degree of mental capacity indicate that personal
circumstances were still weighed in the balance throughout the ﬁrst
half of the twentieth century, just as much as (if not more than) the
nature of any disease or ability to make decisions. In these cases, the
individual's wishes and personality, the perceived likelihood and im-
pact of bad decision-making, and the risks of ﬁnancial abuse were all
considered.
That said, the extent to which a functional approach was adopted
should not be overstated. The complexity of an individual's aﬀairs
certainly had some impact on the CoP's decisions, but the early twen-
tieth century also saw clear conﬁrmation that capacity to manage one's
aﬀairs was global, and could not be assessed in relation to the speciﬁc
decisions that needed to be made. In his judgment in re Walker in 1905,
Vaughan Williams LJ acknowledged that the ‘mere mental capacity’ of a
‘lunatic’ might suﬃce for them to deal with some aspects of their
property, but ‘it is necessary for the protection of lunatics generally that
they should be debarred from the exercise of such powers’ (Re Walker
[1905] 174). The only exception was in relation to making a will:
someone with a receiver in place might still have testamentary capacity
and could then make a will, since this did not interfere with the re-
ceiver's management of their property during their lifetime. Otherwise,
if a receiver had been appointed, then the receiver alone could deal
with the individual's property, no matter how lucid or capable of
making the decision the individual might be. This was upheld in later
years (Re Marshall [1920]), probably encouraged by the growth of the
CoP and the concomitant need for legal certainty surrounding the status
of its interventions. It complicates existing narratives of mental health
law, which describe a move from state intervention on the basis of
classiﬁcation to a more universalist approach to mental illness
(Unsworth, 1987). Seeing incapacity as global was universal inasmuch
as all those found incapable were treated as equally and entirely in-
capable, but it still relied heavily upon the initial classiﬁcation of in-
capacity as a result of disease. The impact of this classiﬁcation or
‘status’ upon an individual's rights became a key criticism of the CoP in
the 1980s and 1990s (Law Commission, 1995, pp. 32–33): by the end of
the century, such weighty classiﬁcations were still alive and well.
There are signs, though, that views of incapacity narrowed some-
what over the second half of the century to exclude those with more
minor forms of mental illness or learning disability. This is diﬃcult to
trace, as changes in the descriptions of those found incapable may re-
ﬂect a shift in diagnostic vocabulary or greater caution in acknowl-
edging partial capacity, rather than any great change in the types of
person who were found incapable. Furthermore, many post-war ar-
chives are not yet open for inspection, and those that are include an
over-representation of older individuals living in a hospital or nursing
home, with what were described as severe memory defects and con-
fusional states.4 A fuller archive may therefore reveal more in time.
That said, a number of factors suggest the arrival of a more cautious
approach to incapacity.
Firstly, the CoP was challenged on its interpretation of incapacity in
1953, seemingly for the ﬁrst time in nearly ﬁfty years (Re Gilchrist
[1907]). Of course, there may have been unrecorded challenges over
the intervening years, but it was not a suﬃciently important point to be
mentioned in textbooks or formal enquiries into CoP work, and most of
the cases in which the Visitors were called to give evidence concerned
the testamentary capacity of a deceased individual, and not the capacity
of the living (TNA LCO 2/5714). The 1953 case of EAKM therefore
marks something of a turning point. M had been found incapable in
1941, and applied in the early 1950s to be restored to her property. The
Master rejected her application and she appealed his decision; the case
was unreported, but recorded in textbooks and archival notes because
of its ﬁndings in relation to the disclosure of Visitors' reports (Hunt &
Phillips, 1954, p. 83 (and later editions); TNA LCO 2/5714). On appeal,
the Lords Justices found in her favour on the grounds that, although she
still experienced certain delusions, she was suﬃciently recovered to
manage her own aﬀairs. Her delusions concerned the past conduct of a
member of her family and seem to have been taken by the Visitors and
Master alike as suﬃcient evidence of continuing incapacity. Her suc-
cessful appeal gave a strong indication that the actual impact of any
inﬁrmity or delusion upon the decisions to be made should henceforth
be considered more closely.
This case coincided with renewed governmental attention to mental
illness in the form of the Percy Commission, convened in 1954 to en-
quire into ‘the law relating to mental health and mental deﬁciency’. Its
report formed the basis of the 1959 Mental Health Act (HMSO, 1957).
The Commission did not see the CoP as within its terms of reference, but
it did hear evidence from the Master and Visitors and made some
passing comments. Notably, the Commission's report warned the CoP
(and other medico-legal practitioners) not to assume too quickly that
individuals who were detained as persons of unsound mind were ne-
cessarily incapable of managing their aﬀairs (HMSO, 1957, pp. 290,
292–293). As I have written elsewhere, the CoP was perhaps more
ﬂexible in practice than this suggested (Weston, 2019), but nevertheless
the 1959 Act made it absolutely clear that hospitalisation should not
mean disenfranchisement. Section 101 stipulated that there was to be
an ‘objective test of mental capacity in every case’ coming before the
CoP. (Hunt & Reed, 1961, pp. v, 4). This encouragement to avoid CoP
interventions unless strictly necessary may well have prompted a nar-
rower view of what constituted incapacity, focusing more upon state of
mind than a wider sense of perceived need or beneﬁt.
This is not to say that the individual's wider situation was ignored in
the second half of the century. Perhaps the most frequently cited
judgment from the ‘old CoP’ is re CAF, which aﬃrmed that incapacity
was a matter of degree, related to ‘the circumstances, including… the
complexity and importance of the property and aﬀairs which he has to
4 This imbalance is clear when considering, for example, that 65% of all those
under the care of the Court of Protection lived at home in the early 1970s (TNA
LCO 65/178), but the open archive contains only two such examples: TNA
J127/188 and J92/300.
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manage or administer’ (Hunt & Reed, 1964). In this particular case, it
was the size of the individual's estate in combination with her diﬃ-
culties with independent thought and communication that rendered her
incapable in the eyes of the CoP, even though it was generally agreed
that she was able to come to a ‘reasoned judgment’ of her own in re-
lation to simple matters. Re CAF was immediately recognised as sig-
niﬁcant and described in a supplement to the ninth edition of Heywood
& Massey's Court of Protection Practice, suggesting that the assessment of
incapacity was by this time recognised more widely as potentially dif-
ﬁcult and controversial.
The circumstances surrounding re CAF were suggestive of another
change in determinations of incapacity. F had suﬀered a series of
strokes, impairing her speech and brain function. She was therefore
typical of one of the groups that came to dominate the work of the CoP
in the second half of the twentieth century: those with an acquired
brain injury, usually the result of a road traﬃc accident, industrial
accident, medical negligence, or as in this case, stroke (Lush, 2018).
They were eventually second in number only to those with disorders
related to aging, often described loosely as ‘senility’ or ‘senile dementia’
(TNA LCO 68/22, Law Commission, 1995, p. 21). These conditions
replaced the mania, delusions, psychosis, melancholia, and ‘dementia’ –
the latter used during this earlier period to refer to incurable mental
disorder not necessarily related to age – which had made up the bulk of
the CoP's earlier caseload (Weston, 2019).
This shift reﬂected both changing prevalence and changing per-
ception. More people were living longer, and research into and
awareness of dementia began to attain a much higher proﬁle. Such
research remained generally pessimistic about anything other than a
rapid cognitive decline amongst those so diagnosed (Hilton, 2015;
Wilson, 2017), meaning that eventual incapacity was consistently seen
as inevitable. Medical interventions were also enabling individuals to
survive events involving brain injury that would, in earlier decades,
have proved fatal, and some of these injuries prompted payments of
compensation which would demand CoP involvement. At the same
time, the introduction of an array of new pharmacological interventions
for mental illness from the 1960s onwards, and the move to reduce
institutional care, both coincided with the emergence of campaigns
focusing upon the rights of those diagnosed with mental illness or what
was then still called mental defect (National Council for Civil Liberties,
1951; United Nations, 1971). Those with all but the most severe diﬃ-
culties were increasingly positioned as able to beneﬁt from treatment,
to live in the community, and in full possession of rights that should
only be removed in the most extreme situations. The bar for incapacity
in cases of mental illness and learning disability was, perhaps, being
raised.
5. Managing property
Having determined that an individual was incapable of managing
their aﬀairs, it fell to the CoP to see that their property was looked after.
The extent of this property in a typical case underwent a dramatic
change in the early twentieth century: the CoP began to deal with many
more small estates. This marked a change from the nineteenth century,
when, as Akihito Suzuki has observed, lunacy inquisitions concerned
almost exclusively the very wealthy (Suzuki, 2006). Evidence to the
1877 Select Committee on Lunacy Law hinted at the aﬄuence of those
found to be lunatics through the process of inquisition, with one expert
witness reporting that ‘a good many’ received an annual income of
£3000 or more (over £200,000 today) (HMSO, 1877, p. 57). The rich
continued to be represented, with the CoP consistently engaged in
managing large houses and country estates, ﬁve and six-ﬁgure in-
heritances, and sometimes much more income than could be spent
(TNA J127/189; J92/25; J92/22; J92/77). Yet, much more modest
estates came to dominate, numerically at least. More of the population
may have owned some property and had a bank or savings accounts by
the 1920s, but such accounts often held a very small balance (Atkinson,
2000), and even a small balance would require legal intervention if its
owner appeared to lack capacity.
This use of the CoP was encouraged by the much easier and cheaper
option of applying for a receiver instead of an inquisition in lunacy. A
Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded noted
the impact of this in 1908, reporting that the CoP had in recent years
handled 606 cases involving income of less than £20 per year
(equivalent to around £1500 today). This constituted 16% of all its
cases (HMSO, 1908, p. 260). The proportion of small estates continued
to rise, and in the 1920s the CoP responded to demand by introducing a
streamlined application process for individuals whose annual income
did not exceed £100 (around £4000 today). Soon afterwards, inspired
by a recommendation within the 1926 Report of the Royal Commission
on Lunacy and Mental Disorder for a ‘poor persons’ correspondence
department’ (HMSO, 1926), a Personal Application Division was set up
to help ‘applicants to obtain an Order for the appointment of a Receiver
as cheaply and as expeditiously as possible’ without instructing a soli-
citor (TNA J92/103). Within just ﬁve years, half of all the applications
were made through this Division (TNA LCO 4/50). Although some in
the legal community felt that the Personal Application Division was
actively (and improperly) advertising its services and encouraging ap-
plicants who could very well aﬀord a solicitor to proceed unrepresented
(TNA LCO 4/50), this was likely borne of broader frustrations with the
CoP and anxiety amongst solicitors about loss of business. In the ar-
chives, the overwhelming majority of personal applications were in-
deed concerned with small estates. Many of these could be dealt with
without appointing a receiver, if there was unlikely to be any ongoing
management required (TNA J92/216; J92/219; J92/197), but even
small funds often required some oversight and administration. By 1975,
one memo recorded that 80% of the CoP's open cases involved annual
incomes of under £1000 (about £8000 today) (TNA LCO 65/178).
The rise in the proportion of CoP cases that involved small estates
coincided with another quiet change in CoP work: staﬀ began to en-
quire more closely into the minutiae of their case ﬁles. At least some of
this was prompted by anxiety about dishonesty and ﬁnancial abuse. ‘I
have been shocked by the number of cases of deliberate fraud’, Master
Methold reported in 1934, after seven years in post (TNA LCO 4/50). To
some extent, this more active engagement reﬂected demand from re-
ceivers, solicitors, and those found incapable. Complaints or requests
were investigated more thoroughly from the 1920s onwards (cf TNA
J92/20 and J92/28), with the Lord Chancellor's Visitors often called
upon to contribute towards such investigations (TNA J92/300; J92/
313; J92/34; J92/118). When asked directly whether the CoP was
adopting a more interventionist approach, senior staﬀ were quick to
deny that they undertook too much detailed inspection of receivers'
activities. They did, however, acknowledge more engagement with case
ﬁles: in 1934, Master Methold described ‘a closer scrutiny’ of cases
taking place, while Assistant Master Poyser implied that they would no
longer aim to leave a person's aﬀairs essentially unchanged wherever
possible during a receivership (TNA LCO 4/50). Scrutiny and active
management were becoming the order of the day, but were accom-
panied by backlogs of work and complaints of delay.
A shift in the CoP's activities is also suggested by the contents of the
leading practitioner's textbook, Heywood & Massey's Court of Protection
Practice (Heywood & Massey, 1900, and subsequent editions). This
went through many editions from 1900 onwards, and included senior
CoP staﬀ amongst its authors from 1920. Early editions focused upon
the procedure for the appointment of a committee or receiver, men-
tioning only brieﬂy the decisions or activities involving the CoP that
might occur subsequently. This balance was reversed in later editions,
which saw new chapters on replacing receivers, conveyancing, litiga-
tion, appeals, marriage, settlements, and annual accounts. Perhaps at
one time, the CoP's primary responsibility had been at the moment of
appointing a receiver and it could then simply wait for receivers to
apply for any further orders if necessary, but by the 1930s, this was only
the beginning of its involvement in an individual's aﬀairs. Especially
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where no solicitor was instructed, this could be time consuming and
laborious for all involved.
The CoP today is criticised for failing to strike the right balance: for
failing to identify and act on cases of fraud or exploitation, and also for
imposing unduly heavy burdens upon receivers or interfering too clo-
sely. Its diﬃculties here are longstanding. Its eﬀorts to look more clo-
sely at receivers' activities were not always welcomed or understood.
Most receivers were family members, and increasingly, they dealt di-
rectly with the CoP with little or no legal or ﬁnancial advice. Mr. Arthur
Day's wife and receiver Louisa Day was sometimes impatient in her
response to the CoP's biannual enquiry as to how she was spending her
husband's small income. ‘I feel I have quite done a good part by him as
the [hospital] Attendant would tell you if you care to inquire’, she
wrote. ‘I never miss the visit & never shall while my Husband is a pa-
tient there he has been an invalid 12 years last October so I think I've
done my part’ TNA (J92/58). Walter Marsh's sister and receiver, Mrs.
Jane Thornley, was regularly confused and angered by the CoP's oc-
casional requests for information, and wrote in simple terms: ‘I dont
understand these forms you keep sending me to ﬁll in’. She was fru-
strated to learn that only Mr. Marsh's weekly income of 10 shillings
(£25 today) was available to her, not the capital, and annoyed by
regular enquiries from the CoP as to how this weekly sum was spent
(TNA J92/114). Margaret Fowler's father was also angered by the ‘high-
handed way’ in which the CoP approached his family's aﬀairs, having
assumed that he as receiver would be given the freedom to deal with his
daughter's Post Oﬃce savings as he saw ﬁt (TNA J92/113; see also J92/
207).
This irritation occasionally led to appeals against CoP decisions
regarding income and expenditure. Any person aﬀected by the deci-
sions of the CoP could appeal to a Judge in Lunacy, although this right
was infrequently exercised (TNA LCO 4/50; LCO 4/55). Master
Methold's ﬁrst two appeals were, in his words, ‘one case where the
patient's wife was his Receiver and asked to be given the whole of his
fortune’, and ‘a professional Receiver’ seeking ‘a larger remuneration
than I had given to him’ (TNA LCO 4/50). Other appeals concerned
payments to family members for automobile outings, the cost of which
consumed nearly half the available income (TNA J92/57), and the
payment of income to a local authority to cover the individual's
maintenance (re TRM [1939]). Gifts and settlements proved particularly
diﬃcult. Late nineteenth century cases showed a reluctance to provide
discretionary ﬁnancial support to the wider family of someone found
incapable, unless there were clear indicators of a prior intent to do so.
Such questions had to be based on what the individual would have done
if they were able to make the decision, but the Lunacy Oﬃce required
evidence of the individual's speciﬁc intentions regarding each payment
or settlement. It was not prepared to extrapolate from past patterns of
behaviour to new situations, nor to guess at an individual's likely views
even when the proposed gifts seemed reasonable. In one case Cotton LJ
remarked that ‘it is not our business to deal benevolently or charitably
with the property of the lunatic’, and added that applications for pay-
ments of an altruistic kind, such as a small but regular gift to an im-
poverished niece or nephew, ‘ought to be discouraged rather than en-
couraged’ (Re Darling [1888]; see also Re Frost [1870]). This was part
and parcel of a desire to preserve the incapable individual's estate un-
changed so far as possible, which began to fade as a more interven-
tionist approach to estate management took over.
In the early twentieth century, there were signs of a diﬀerent ap-
proach to estimating what someone found incapable would have done,
with a more imaginative reading of their wishes. This was enabled by
s.171 of the Law of Property Act 1925 and encouraged by changes to
intestacy provisions brought about by the Administration of Estates Act
of the same year, although such decisions harked back to an earlier
judgment from 1816 (Ex parte Whitbread [1816]; Skinner, 1999). The
basis on which to decide what someone would have done was argued in
1927, in a case concerning a settlement in favour of a Miss Freeman's
second cousins. The Crown's case was in keeping with the older view: ‘It
is a matter of pure speculation whether the lunatic would have left her
property to second cousins’, and so there should not be any settlement
in their favour. But this did not ﬁnd support. The Court was able to
imagine that Miss Freeman, if she were aware of all the circumstances
that had arisen since her incapacity, would be likely to choose her
second cousins as the beneﬁciaries of her property after her death (re
Freeman [1927]). Also relying on the Law of Property Act and its re-
quirement to avoid ‘injustice’, another settlement in 1941 directed
funds to various Masonic charities. This was because the person found
incapable had come into an inheritance, the terms of ‘which indicated
that the testator expected that the patient would devote such funds to
such objects’ (re TCW [1941]). The court was willing to imagine,
without any speciﬁc evidence to this eﬀect, that the recipient of this
windfall would have wanted to honour such a wish.
This is similar to what is now described as a substituted judgment
approach, where there is an attempt on behalf of someone found in-
capable to make the choice that most closely represents the decision
they would themselves have made. When mental capacity law came
under scrutiny in the 1990s, the substituted judgment approach was
contrasted with a ‘best interests’ approach, in which the decision to be
taken was ‘that which the decision-maker thinks is best for the person
concerned’ (Law Commission, 1991, para 4.22). The Law Commission
preferred this ‘best interests’ approach, albeit modiﬁed with elements of
substituted judgment to reduce its paternalistic overtones (Law
Commission, 1995). Broadly speaking, this was adopted in the MCA,
2005. As has been noted elsewhere, the original form of substituted
judgment envisaged in the Whitbread case of 1816 paid little attention
to the individual whose decision was being imagined and their personal
views or foibles: instead, the court considered in the abstract what a
reasonable person would be likely to decide (Szerletics, 2012). These
CoP cases from the mid-twentieth century are similar, in that relatively
little attention is paid to the incapable person as an individual. In Miss
Freeman's case, the only personalised comment about her was to note
that she had made a number of wills before her incapacity. This was
taken to suggest that she would have wanted to make some testamen-
tary disposition in the circumstances that had arisen, instead of letting
her estate pass to the Crown. Later cases also showed little inclination
to reﬂect on the individual whose aﬀairs were in question, but rather, to
consider the decisions that might be made by a hypothetical reasonable
person in the same position (re RHC [1962], Re L (WJG) [1965]). In
practice, then, this mode of substituted judgment delivered relatively
de-personalised decisions, against which the ‘best interests’ approach
proposed in, 1995 could be contrasted. We might therefore see the
move towards ‘best interests’ as a reaction to the implementation of the
substituted judgment approach in these older CoP cases.
Gifts and settlements continually featured prominently as a diﬃcult
issue for the CoP for two main reasons. Firstly, rising death duties over
the mid-twentieth century incentivised the wealthy to disperse at least
some portion of their fortune amongst relatives during their lifetime,
and receivers sought in many cases to replicate this with the property of
those found incapable. Secondly, the 1959 Mental Health Act placed the
Court's jurisdiction on a new statutory footing, which led to a small
ﬂurry of reported cases to provide interpretations of key terms from the
Act including ‘family’ and ‘beneﬁt’, contemplating the basis upon which
the patient's likely wishes should be imagined. In broad terms, discre-
tionary settlements for the purposes of estate planning were permitted,
including the avoidance of death duties, the production of equality
between family members, and overcoming intestacy provisions to se-
cure the interests of illegitimate children (Re CWM [1951]; Re CEM
[1956]; Re AHS [1956]; Re CCHR [1957]; Re RHC [1962]; Re CEFD
[1963]; Re L (WJG) [1965]; Re DML [1965]; Re TB [1967]). It was,
therefore, somewhat disingenuous for the preface of the ninth edition of
Heywood & Massey to record that the introduction of statutory will
making in 1969 had disrupted more than six centuries of the CoP's duty
‘not to interfere with rights of succession’ (Hunt, Reed, & Whiteman
Reed & Whiteman, 1971, p. v). Some interference had become
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acceptable, as the CoP engaged more closely with receivers and the
lives of its charges. This no doubt paved the way for statutory wills.
It was not only ﬁnances that interested the CoP. As the body with
ultimate responsibility for all expenditure, it might be required to give
approval for costly medical treatments and had some reason to enquire
into living circumstances. This was in spite of the fact that it had no
jurisdiction over matters of personal welfare except in those vanishingly
rare circumstances before 1959 when a committee of the person had
been appointed under the old inquisition process. Unsurprisingly, its
interest in personal matters could lead to disagreements. Mrs. Emma
Ward lived with her son, who had acted as her receiver following her
nervous breakdown in 1924. Her accommodation was found ‘un-
satisfactory’ by a Lord Chancellor's Visitor, and her son responded
furiously to an ‘impertinent’ letter to that eﬀect from the CoP. ‘My
mother is a strong active woman who unfortunately at times will
quarrel with any other woman who lives near her’, he explained.
When eventually they have had enough of her, my mother writes to
your Department complaining of where she is living - and landladies
& neighbours complain to me. This has been going on for over six
years and has caused me to have to move three times…. Just get
your Mr. Thompson to state in writing explicitly in what way the
accommodation is unsatisfactory. His swaggering around in a large
car has made my mother discontented.
With less evident anger, others found themselves addressing the CoP
with details of daily living such as why they did not want a wireless,
requests for new underwear, and permission to give wedding presents
to family (TNA J92/39, J92/202; J92/41). In the 1970s, as in the
1930s, generalised concerns and complaints about the CoP suggested
that it was going beyond its brief, ‘prying into matters which don't
concern the jurisdiction of the court’ and creating excessive volumes of
work for itself by trying to control receivers too closely (TNA LCO 65/
178). This coincided with broader eﬀorts in the 1970s to reduce legal
controls over those with mental illnesses, ultimately leading to the
accidental creation in the 1980s of a legal lacuna concerning personal
decision-making on behalf of those lacking capacity (Re F [1990]).
Irritation ﬂowed both ways. Flashes of annoyance in the archives
suggest that CoP oﬃcials were sometimes less than impressed by re-
ceivers and their legal representatives. ‘This Aﬃd[avit] is quite useless’,
recorded Master Theobald in 1921, as part of a thoroughgoing critique
of some professional correspondence coming into his oﬃce (TNA J92/
34). ‘I have on my desk at this moment a glaring example of the ap-
parent incompetence of a certain ﬁrm of solicitors’, retaliated Chief
Clerk Gerard Mills, when faced with a complaint about the CoP (TNA
LCO 4/47). Red ﬂags about competence and reliability on the part of
receivers encouraged particularly close attention. A bad-tempered spat
ensued when Mrs. Bradley's daughter and receiver Constance asked to
be given more of her mother's income for her own beneﬁt. ‘The state-
ment ﬁled by the sol[icitor]s is an impudent aﬀront to the authority of
this M[aster]’, noted one oﬃcial, after recording that Constance already
took a larger portion of Mrs. Bradley's income than was spent on Mrs.
Bradley herself. A clerk quickly contacted the hospital where Mrs.
Bradley lived, to verify that Constance was telling the truth about vis-
iting her mother regularly, and a full review of the various decisions so
far made about Mrs. Bradley's estate was conducted. Constance was
eventually reminded in ominous tones that she only received anything
at all at the Master's absolute discretion. This discretion was not tested
again (TNA J92/48). In other cases lay receivers overspent, muddled
receivership money with their own, failed to deliver accounts on time
or at all, behaved suspiciously, and sometimes disappeared altogether,
leaving CoP staﬀ to battle with sometimes chaotic situations as best
they could (TNA J92/57; J92/18; J92/21; J92/315; J92/202).
Receivers were often replaced, usually as a result of their own inﬁrmity
and age but sometimes for more worrying reasons: ‘where the receiver
has not proved to be a ﬁt and proper person… rendered unsatisfactory
accounts or failed to account, lent the patient's money on mortgage’,
and so on (Hunt & Phillips, 1954, p. 80). Recent commentary on the
new CoP suggests that the timely identiﬁcation of ﬁnancial abuse re-
mains a signiﬁcant problem; the balance between eﬀective control and
undue interference remains diﬃcult to strike (Terrell et al., 2018).
6. Survival and reform
The role and existence of the CoP was quietly questioned in the
1970s, for the ﬁrst time since the start of the century. Sixty years ear-
lier, the proposal in the air had been to hand over its duties to the Board
of Control, which was responsible for mental hospitals and their pa-
tients. Henry Studdy Theobald, Master from 1907 to 1921, would
happily have seen his oﬃce dissolved and this idea initially gathered
some popularity, only to fall by the wayside amidst other aspects of law
reform then to be ﬁrmly rejected by the end of his tenure (TNA LCO 4/
47). To be sure, the CoP was still criticised as ineﬃcient and expensive,
but until the 1970s the proposed solutions – those implemented and
those abandoned alike – addressed its processes, staﬃng, and funding,
rather than the existence of the CoP itself. In short, there was no in-
ternal appetite or external pressure for radical change.
Unspeciﬁed internal restructuring and a larger budget were the
solutions to its administrative problems in 1934 (TNA LCO 4/50), but
this was a temporary ﬁx. Over the ten years to 1948, staﬃng levels
increased further by only 3% while the number of cases rose by 47%
(TNA LCO 4/55; LCO 4/409). Workloads were overwhelming and so-
licitors persistently complained about delays, setting a pattern that
would be followed for decades to come. One wrote in heated terms in
1947 about the CoP's ‘antediluvian procedure which originally seems to
have been designed in Bedlam itself’ (TNA LCO 4/54). A decade later,
the position was slightly better but still not ideal, and the report of the
1954 Enquiry into mental health law suggested that delays might be
avoided if the property of those found incapable were managed by local
authorities in the case of smaller estates (HMSO, 1957). This was en-
ergetically investigated but eventually shelved due to the ‘complicated
legislation’ that would be required for a relatively small number of
estates (TNA LCO 2/5701). Another option was to adopt the more
hands-oﬀ approach to patients' estates that was rumoured to exist in
Scotland, and a fact-ﬁnding mission to Edinburgh took place in 1967
but ended in disappointment: ‘the procedure is extremely expensive and
I am very far from convinced that the patient gets such good service
from a curator who is left to his own devices’ (TNA LCO 4/409).
Adding to its woes was the matter of cost. It was acknowledged that
the CoP delivered a wide-ranging and extensive service, greater in
scope than was found in other jurisdictions, but it was no longer as
comfortably self-ﬁnancing as it had once been. The problem was ‘those
who want a Rolls Royce for the price of a Ford Cortina’ (TNA LCO 4/
409): the CoP was the Rolls Royce of incapacity law, but its clients were
no longer the extremely wealthy who could aﬀord to pay for this. In
1908, it still showed a substantial annual surplus of £11,000, nearly
40% of its income from fees and charges on the estates it oversaw, but
this did not last. Smaller estates meant smaller income, as fees were
generally calculated as a percentage of the property being managed. In
the case of particularly small estates, fees would be waived to avoid
hardship. The ﬁrst sustained losses in the books of the CoP were tem-
porarily handled by an increase in the fees and charges in the early
1920s, which returned the CoP to proﬁtability for the last time. A
deﬁcit became a permanent ﬁxture from the 1930s until the 1990s,
dented only slightly by further fee increases (TNA LCO 2/7695; LCO
65/178; LCO 68/22; House of Commons, 1991).
The proximity of the CoP to a welfare service meant that some
subsidy from the Exchequer was largely (if not entirely) seen as ac-
ceptable, at least over the middle decades of the century (TNA LCO 2/
7695).5 This proximity may also help to explain its survival. From the
5 For a note of dissent, see the letter from Cartwright Sharp of the Law
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Liberal reforms of the early twentieth century through to the arrival of
the NHS in 1948 and beyond, centralised services were being in-
troduced for the beneﬁt of the young, the old, the unemployed, and the
unwell. A service to protect the property of those unable to protect it
themselves could be seen as part and parcel of these schemes. But its
ﬁnancial demands also left it open to more criticism, especially as the
welfare state itself as well as the costs of the Lord Chancellor's Oﬃce
were squeezed in the 1970s. This was, it seems, an unhappy period for
the CoP. Concerns persisted about the ‘the whole position of the Court
of Protection, which seems to be generally ineﬃcient, cumbersome and
expensive’. The position of the Lord Chancellor's Visitors was criticised,
as their qualiﬁcations and salary did not seem to tally with the nature of
their work (TNA LCO 65/178). The Visitors themselves hinted at their
dissatisfaction with the CoP (TNA LCO 65/17). Furthermore, and for
the ﬁrst time in many decades, there were sustained complaints and
concerns aired by MPs and in Parliament, including calls for a formal
enquiry (House of Commons, 1973). Complaints about CoP investment
practices had ﬁrst been aired in the 1950s (TNA LCO 2/5710), but this
issue as well as the fees charged by the CoP was taken up with new
energy.
In this context, the eﬀective dissolution of the CoP and the oﬃce of
the Lord Chancellor's Visitors was tentatively discussed. The idea was to
place all judicial and audit work in the hands of the county courts, and
the welfare work with social services. But this stalled when the CoP was
excluded from the Review of the Mental Health Act in 1975. This fol-
lowed a pattern set by the 1926 and 1954–57 enquiries into mental
health law, which cast the CoP as something entirely separate. Eﬀorts to
reform mental health law focused very much throughout the twentieth
century on questions of treatment and involuntary detention, and not
the property, or property rights, of the mentally ill. This separation not
only meant that the CoP largely evaded criticism and public attention,
but also rendered its work somewhat unknowable, as comprehensive
reviews and critiques were absent. The ‘work of the Court remains a
mystery’, remarked one civil servant rather sadly in 1979 (TNA LCO
65/178).
This air of unknowability was aided by the veil of discretion which
had been drawn over the vast majority of CoP activities throughout
most of the twentieth century, with proceedings heard in camera.
Perhaps the memory of those very public nineteenth century inquisi-
tions lingered, or at least, the reluctance of the general public to air
their personal, ﬁnancial, and medical matters in open court was hy-
pothesised. CoP cases were an exception to the principle that justice
should be administered in public, because of ‘the quasi-paternal jur-
isdiction’ of the judge. When acting ‘in lunacy’, the House of Lords had
found in 1913, ‘the Court is really sitting primarily to guard the inter-
ests of the ward or lunatic’, and not to decide a dispute, and so their
primary duty was the lunatic's care and not to the public delivery of
justice (Scott v Scott [1913]). It seemed to go without saying that care
demanded silence. This practice was criticised by Ungoed-Thomas LJ in
1971 (Re W (EEM) [1971]), to little apparent eﬀect, and it was only
when the CoP became a court of record in 2007 that its judgements
were published with any regularity. A tension between protecting in-
dividual privacy and avoiding accusations of sinister secrecy remains
clearly in evidence today (Doughty & Magrath, 2016). The low proﬁle
of the CoP's decisions throughout the twentieth century may have fa-
cilitated its survival, allowing it to avoid too great a scrutiny from the
general public or from more oﬃcial inquiries into mental health law.
It may also have mattered to the outcome of discussion in the 1970s
that the incumbent Master of the Court of Protection seemed less open
to reform than his predecessor, with many memos reﬂecting anxiously
upon his likely opposition. In this he was joined by the Permanent
Secretary in the Lord Chancellor's Department, Sir Denis Dobson, who
was notoriously averse to change (Anon, 1995). In the end, reform of
the CoP fell to be considered as part of a wider scheme of reform across
the Lord Chancellor's Department. The problem of the four very senior
and costly Visitors was solved by replacing them with a panel of
medical, legal, and general visitors, with the bulk of their work to be
carried out by general visitors who did not require any particular
qualiﬁcations (E. R. Taylor, 1982). The CoP then gained a Management
Division by taking over the Oﬃcial Solicitor's Receivership Division in
1983, but eﬀectively lost this to the Public Trustee in 1986 and then
saw all of its administrative responsibilities transferred to the new
Public Trust Oﬃce in 1994. Yet its survival in essence, along with the
extent of its existing and anticipated caseload and its resultant claims to
expertise left it well positioned to provide a conceptual foundation
when the Law Commission and the government surveyed the ﬁeld of
mental incapacity law in the 1990s (HMSO, 1997; HMSO, 1998; Law
Commission, 1991, 1995). The ‘old’ Court of Protection was formally
abolished but reborn as a superior court of record under the Mental
Capacity Act, 2005, dealing not only with its pre-existing business of
ﬁnance, powers of attorney, and statutory wills, but also personal and
healthcare decisions for those who lack capacity.
7. Conclusion
It was not envisaged, when the jurisdiction of the old Court of
Protection was adjusted and consolidated in 1890, that the seemingly
modest changes therein would have such impact. Nor was it anticipated
that so many people would eventually apply to it for help. A modiﬁed
jurisdiction combined with changing social, economic, and medical
contexts drove up the numbers of those found incapable upwards over
most of the twentieth century, save for when the post-war welfare state
alleviated some of the pressures that encouraged CoP interventions in
the 1950s. These trends continue today, and have been further heigh-
tened by the changes introduced in the 2005 Mental Capacity Act; the
future impact of ongoing shifts in social norms and attitudes, welfare
and care services, medicine, and the wider economy remains to be seen.
A growing caseload and wider variety of patients and receivers in
the ﬁrst half of the century was met with more active involvement on
the part of the CoP in the management of the aﬀairs of those found
incapable. This generated its own problems in the form of costs, delays,
and sometimes testy relationships with receivers and professional ad-
visers, but led to new approaches and case law, particularly regarding
gifts, settlements, and substituted judgements. It also prompted the
identiﬁcation of more cases of fraud or mismanagement. Striking the
right balance between identifying dishonesty or abuse, and placing
overly heavy demands on those acting on behalf of others, remains a
diﬃculty today. It is also still the case that the vast majority of the
workload concerning those found incapable is uncontroversial, un-
contested, and settled without the need for a formal hearing. In the
contemporary Court of Protection, decisions regarding health and
welfare or deprivation of liberty are much more likely to be contentious
than decisions regarding property and aﬀairs (Ruck Keene et al., 2019),
and the obsolescence of the inquisition process in the early twentieth
century meant that health and welfare was not for the most part within
the ‘old’ CoP's jurisdiction. The issues coming before the Court today
are therefore diﬀerent in some respects, but the bulk of its work – ap-
pointing deputies and issuing one-oﬀ orders in relation to property and
aﬀairs, appointing replacement trustees, executing statutory wills, and
so on, all with a careful eye on the individual circumstances of each
case – is a clear continuation of its former role.
This is not to say that the activities of the CoP have not changed at
all. Attention to its history reveals that it was not quite the same kinds
of people that have been found incapable, over the years. As the cate-
gory of ‘lunacy’ fell by the wayside in the early twentieth century and
ideas of mental illness shifted to include a wider variety of mental
states, the idea of incapacity also expanded to include the elderly, the
frail, and those who were vulnerable in the face of their own
(footnote continued)
Commission to Sir Hume Boggis-Rolfe of September 1967, in TNA LCO 4/409.
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impulsiveness or pressures from others. For a period of time, at least,
personal circumstances and relationships were just as important as
medical diagnoses. The middle of the twentieth century perhaps saw
the greatest variation amongst those found incapable, with these ‘bor-
derline’ cases of vulnerability or advanced age co-existing in the CoP's
caseﬁles alongside severe and moderate psychiatric illnesses and a
growing variety of other conditions. There are signs that this shifted
again in the second half of the century, with a narrower conception of
incapacity emerging and a renewed attention to medical diagnoses and
classiﬁcations. By the 1980s, cases of dementia and acquired brain in-
jury had come to dominate the CoP workload, and this remains the
position today. Over the course of the twentieth century, then, the ty-
pical case coming before the CoP changed from one concerning a very
wealthy, middle-aged individual detained as a person of unsound mind
and diagnosed with mania or delusions, to an older person of un-
remarkable means, suﬀering from dementia and cared for at home or in
a nursing facility. In addition, the redesign of the Court of Protection in
the 2005 MCA has meant that it now deals with more individuals with
learning disabilities than before, under its new jurisdiction over health
and welfare matters. Yet, ﬂuctuations over the course of the century in
who was being found incapable demonstrate that change is not always
linear, and that interpretations of incapacity can expand as well as
contract.
In spite of its considerable power, the substantial number of people
aﬀected, and its evident struggles over the years with eﬃciency and the
proper extent of its responsibilities, the CoP proved remarkably re-
silient. In large part this was down to the absence of any external
pressures for change, with issues of psychiatric treatment and in-
voluntary detention occupying the minds of those concerned with
mental health law and its reform. It is telling that, even when mental
incapacity ﬁnally became a live issue in the 1990s, this was not pro-
pelled by concerns regarding the CoP but rather, by the lacuna in the
law concerning capacity to consent to medical treatment. We might see
this as evidence of success on the part of the CoP: there were no
scandals or crises to prompt action, and it was suﬃciently ﬂexible and
responsive to accommodate changing attitudes towards mental illness
and money alike. We might also pause to wonder why ﬁnancial pro-
tections or abuses attracted so little attention, for the most part, and to
reﬂect on this legacy for the management of incapacity today.
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